Linguistic Profiling of the Concept of Sovereignty in Contemporary Weeklies

Laura Polkowska
Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University, Warsaw
laurapolkowska@op.pl
ORCID: 0000-0003-3284-6556

ABSTRACT

Scientific objective: The aim of the paper is to reconstruct the linguistic profiles of the concept of sovereignty in contemporary weeklies. Research methods: The method of linguistic profiling, worked out within the Lublin Ethnolinguistic School represented by Jerzy Bartmiński, was used. Results and conclusions: In Polish public realm two different sub-discourses can be observed. They can be called right-wing and liberal. Within them, values are conceptualized in a completely different way. In the first profile—I call it the isolation profile—sovereignty is identified as the total independence of the state, which is based on its strong, dominant position in the international arena. This value is considered as a prized possession that can only be gained through a fight. In the second—cooperative—model, sovereignty is a synonym of the state subjectivity—a result of a balanced cooperation with other entities and associated with participation in collective decision-making. Cognitive value: Reconstruction of two profiles of sovereignty is part of the axiological research and enriches it with an analysis of one of the important socio-political values. It seems that the future dictionary definitions of the word sovereignty should take into account both perspectives to reflect the complexity of the Polish axiosphere.

KEYWORDS
axiology, linguistic picture of the world, profiling, sovereignty
Sovereignty is one of those values that is often talked about in Polish public realm, especially in recent years. However, as with most abstract concepts, it is not understood by all sides of public debate in the same way, which in itself can fuel social axiological disputes. The purpose of the paper is to reconstruct the concept of sovereignty and its linguistic picture in contemporary journalism. The analysis will use the conceptual profiling method developed within the Lublin Ethnolinguistic School.

The development of the cognitive trend in linguistics has brought a new insight into language as closely related to the subjective process of perception of reality, and the subjectivity, which exposes the consciousness of the sender—attitude, point of view, values—underpins the concept of the linguistic picture of the world. Language is not an objective reflection of reality, but it only interprets the reality. Consequently, the linguistic picture is a set of judgments about the world that have been recorded in language (Bartmiński, 1990, p. 110). This categorization depends on certain aspects that are taken into account and selected by the sender when deciding on an object. In this way, a concept profile is created based on a specific perspective (Bartmiński, 1990, pp. 117–118).

In profiling, the aforementioned point of view plays a key role, which in accordance to Jerzy Bartmiński's definition is: “the subject-cultural factor that determines the manner of speaking about the object, including on the categorization of the subject [...] on the selection of features that are referred to in the subject in specific statements” (1990, p. 111). It will form the basis of two sovereignty profiles that have been distinguished on the basis of texts published in four opinion weeklies: Polityka, Newsweek, Do Rzeczy, and W Sieci in 2016 and 2017.

“Sovereignty” in Dictionaries

The first dictionary of the Polish language in which the noun “sovereignty” was noted is the Dictionary of the Polish Language prepared by Witold Doroszewski in 1958–1969. One reads in it that sovereignty is “the political, economic, and social independence of the state, independence from other states in internal affairs and external relations.” For comparison, the latest dictionary—the Great Polish Dictionary (Żmigrodzki, 2007)—defines “sovereignty” similarly, however, it only takes into account the political aspect: “the independence of the state in conducting internal and foreign policy.” In all other contemporary dictionaries, the term is defined in the same way—each explanation is constituted by the noun “independence” [niezależność], but it is worth noting that the scope of it is considerable. Doroszewski bases independence on three pillars—political, economic, and social one. The lexicographers formulated this requirement much more generally and they limited it to only one—to economic sphere, and to all kinds of economic connections (cf. Dunaj, 1996: “independence of a political subject (usually a state) from foreign power”; Baňko, 2000: “sovereign state, sovereign power or institution are independent of others”; Dubisz, 2003: “independence of state power in relations with other states and organizations”).

Profiles of Sovereignty in Contemporary Journalism

The analysis of texts published in contemporary weeklies has allowed the author to distinguish two profiles of sovereignty, which have been called— isolation and cooperative profiles. The first is strongly associated with the right-wing (traditional) point of view, the second represents the liberal (modern) perspective. It turns out that the concept of sovereignty—with a fairly clear and coherent semantics—is conceptualized in different ways. In the rest of the text they will be characterized in greater detail.
Isolation Profile

The isolation profile, reflecting the right-wing viewpoint, is most common in contemporary journalism. In *Do Rzeczy* and *W Sieci* the articles, on the basis of which the isolation profile can be reconstructed, are subject-oriented, author-specific. However, in *Polityka* and *Newsweek* they are characterized by meta-textuality, and thus, this profile is considered to be mediated or quoted—publishers report the way in which people with conservative views understand sovereignty. Of course, it can be expected that the type of importance of such conceptualized sovereignty will depend on the ideological orientation of the weekly, but the positive or negative contextual characterization of the concept does not affect the components that form the isolation profile of the sovereignty. It only changes, thanks to the use of the connotation mechanism, the distribution of individual marks, which will be discussed later.

Within this profile, sovereignty is generally understood as “the independence of the state from other entities,” which coincides with Polish lexicographic definitions of this value. However, its conceptualization is much more detailed and in many respects deviates from traditional understanding or significantly complements it.

As part of the profile, three aspects can be distinguished that will allow categorizing the semantic content of the concept. First, independence is understood in a maximalist way within the isolation profile, as there is no dependence on other countries or institutions. The attitude of publishers to sovereignty understood in this way can be given by means of the explanation “no one has the right to interfere” or the well-known saying “a man’s home is his castle” (cf. *Law and Justice* political party understands sovereignty in a “peasant way” that no one will interfere in *Polish affairs* (NS, 28/16); *EU authorities have no reason to meddle in Poland’s internal affairs and violate its sovereignty* (PL, 11/17)). Sovereignty, therefore, means complete independence of decision-making. Any attempts to include foreign entities in the intrastate problems are seen as activities that contradict this value and are extremely harmful, and in some contexts directly or in an allusive way referred to as betrayal (see: *Kukiz supporters are really sensitive to such gestures as seeking support abroad. And they intend to use the same [...] sovereign flame as Law and Justice* (WS, 47/16); *In recent months, they[people of the old system] have not hesitated even before calls to impose various penalties and sanctions on Poland. I will say it openly, it is betrayal. We have to solve Polish matters in Poland* (WS, 43/13)). In the same way, as a manifestation of the lack of state sovereignty and a testimony of national treason, the agreement to investigate the Smolensk disaster by the Russians is treated (cf. *no sovereign state after such a tragedy, after such treatment by a potential perpetrator would not behave in this way* (WS, 38/16)).

Full separateness seen as the foundation of sovereignty also manifests itself at the territorial level. The protection of borders takes on a new meaning, which is not related to countering the aggression of a foreign power, but refers to opposing immigration. The isolation character of sovereignty understood in this way is best reflected by the symbolism of the wall or fence built around the state, which is to protect it from unwanted outsiders. The figure of a stranger used in these contexts, representing different values, culture, and religion, supports the antithetical nature of the concept of politics, in which openness is contrasted with sovereignty (cf. *opposition to...*).

---

1 The author cited a source as follows: the abbreviation stands for the weekly: NS—Newsweek; PL—Polityka; WS—W Sieci; DR—Do Rzeczy. The first of the numbers is an issue number, the second—the last two digits of the annual date.
open society patterns à la Soros is also growing. Issues of national identity, sovereignty, defense of national interests, and protection of borders have become of key importance. [...] When the construction of the fence began on the southern border of Hungary, Viktor Orbán was attacked in the EU for it. [...] And the first decisions of Donald Trump show that [...] he intends to keep his election promises, including the expulsion of millions of illegal immigrants from Mexico and the construction of a wall along the entire border with this country (DR, 8/17)). Thanks to this, a specific reevaluation of traditional concepts takes place, although in Poland everything that is “open” evokes positive associations (cf. “honest conversation” [otwarta rozmowa]; “have / keep an open mind” [mieć otwarty umysł]—willingly accept some truths, knowledge / to wait before making a judgment; “to keep open house” [czyjś dom jest dla kogoś otwarty]—when someone welcomes visitors at any time, (Dubisz, 2003)). Yet, introducing an element of strangeness (negatively valued and suggesting threat) to the above system, (Pajdzińska, 1991, pp. 26–27) characterizes openness negatively and makes it become something undesirable. Within the imaginary construct thus created, the wall, introduced as an allegory, but understood literally at the same time, becomes a distinguishing feature of the postulated closed attitude focused on self-interest, underlying the sovereignty. Such an attitude is conditioned by a certain thoughtlessness, natural for every man. Wojciech Burszta calls it the ethnocentric matrix (2013, p. 18) (cf. every state has the sovereign right to defend its interests, if only it is not related to aggression towards others. I was surprised by the Israelis why they didn’t build the wall, and finally they did (DR, 5/17)). So not only the idea of openness, but also the very concept of the wall changes its natural characteristic, which in this case is negative (see “a wall of mistrust,” “a wall of reluctance,” “a wall of indifference,” “a wall of prejudice” (Dubisz, 2003)).

By the way, it is worth noting that the inclusion of Poland and Europe is symbolically annulled in the same contexts (cf. Prochorowa, 1998)—sovereignty rhetoric is at the same time anti-European (cf. Trump’s supporters like the anti-European and sovereign rhetoric of the Polish government (PL, 51/16)). The reluctant, or at least suspicious attitude towards supranational institutions such as the European Union is part of the concept of sovereignty as extreme separateness and independence (cf. If there are not enough allies in the gradual dismantling of the European project, it should be completely abandoned. It is in the capacity for such resignation PiS intellectuals see the final test for the sovereignty and subjectivity of Poland (PL, 7/2017)). Persuasive phrases, such as “the colonial state,” “manorialism (folwark system)” or “Poland’s brain drainage”—all describing the situation of the country present in European structures—expose dependence as a somewhat pathological condition, especially from the perspective of contemporary values. Meanwhile, autonomy, crucial for sovereignty, should be maintained at all levels of statehood, e.g. legislative—international law cannot be superior to the national law (cf. Today for Polish sovereignty these are fundamental matters. Such as the relationship between Polish law and EU law (JS, 11/17); the European Union suppresses individual rights, human rights, and sovereignty rights (DR, 47/16)); monetary—a common, supranational currency makes the state non-sovereign (cf. We could join the group of fastest-growing EU countries only at the expense of adopting the euro and other solutions that would completely deprive us of our sovereignty (WS, 4/17)); mass information—the interference of the media in which foreign capital has a share, is unacceptable in the political life of the country (cf. Almost 80% of the press is in the hands of foreign capital, including over 90% of the regional press. About 75% of this foreign capital is German. These proportions are unheard of in the world, in normal, sovereign states. This is the shape of the market that colonial states have (DR, 12/17)).

In this last case, the author observes some kind of paradox—on the one hand, independence of the media is postulated as the basis of state sovereignty, on the other, it is precisely independent
of state power, because privatemedia are treated as a threat to the sovereignty. This is because within the media issues two aspects constituting the isolation profile intersect. The second is to associate sovereignty with strength, and this, manifested in internal policy, is equivalent to a strong central authority that controls as many sectors of public life as possible.

The concept of sovereignty in terms of extreme separateness also leads to the negation of a fairly commonly formulated alternative resulting from geopolitical conditions, according to which the resignation from cooperation with the West will push Poland into Russia’s influence (cf. If someone adopts such an assumption, he recognizes that in Poland really impossible policy is pursued, understood as sovereignty [...] This preserves the disastrous social system, the mechanism of external and internal exploitation. In Poland, there is a manorialism (folwark system) (DR, 26/17)). The idea that the sovereignty and strength are closely related is at the root of the falsification of this approach. The second subcategory that can be distinguished as part of the isolation profile will be discussed in greater detail.

Within the right-wing point of view, a necessary condition of sovereignty is the strong position of the state entity on the international stage. One could propose such an explanation that reflects the essence of the statement “strength and domination give independence” and seems to coincide with the content of the saying “the power comes with size” (cf. Marshal Piłsudski and Jarosław Kaczyński dedicated their lives to the issue of Poland’s independence and sovereignty, both rebuild it strength (WS, 46/16); in the countries of the European Union there will be more and more manifestations of true popular sympathy for his [Putin] regime, treated as an example of “strong power,” sovereign, national, and anti-immigrant (WS, 46/16)). This aspect is included in many statements built on the antithesis. Strength and sovereignty are contrasted with attitudes, names of which belong to the semantic field of “submission.” Verbs and phrases such as “to bow,” “to give in to pressure,” “to give up,” “to submit to the will” appear, but definitely in opposition to a strong, sovereign policy, lexemes like “to submit,” “submissive,” and “submission” are used, which are associated with the synonyms of “coercion” and “threat,” e.g. submissive to the EU dictate / Brussels blackmail / pressure from Europe / pressure from the Union European Union; years of submission; pursue a submissive policy (cf. the PO government has embarked on Polish sovereignty in submissive policy towards the EU, and therefore the PiS government’s priority is to replace submission with assertiveness (NS, 28/16); we must be sovereign and we will not bow to anyone (NS, 30/16); the PiS government is doing very well: it cares for the sovereignty of the country, it is not subject to the dictates of Brussels (NS, 42/16); Poland cannot be submissive to any international organization (DR, 37/16); the idea of forcing Visegrad countries to submit fully (DR, 10/17); Beata Szydło’s government is not going to succumb to Brussels (DR, 23/17); “total opposition” responds by promoting its unrealistic submissive policy in recent years (DR, 11/17)). The collected material also includes such phrases as “sovereign power,” “absolute sovereignty,” and “power” or “empire’s sovereignty,” which support the conceptualization of sovereignty and constituted power and present its dominant character.

It is worth emphasizing that the creation of the world, reconstructed on the basis of contexts in which the isolation profile of values is updated, has a clearly bivalent character (see Głowiński, 2009, p. 225; Kęp-Figura, 2010). Two opposing, extreme models of foreign policy based on strength or submission create the international relations universe. The publishers do not mention indirect possibilities, e.g. cooperation based on collective consensus development, which would complicate this image of reality based on an easy to assimilate dichotomy. Thanks to it, it becomes possible to expose the key concept for ideologies based on national values, namely strength (Kłosińska, 2012, pp. 106–108). In liberal weeklies, it is subjected to additional hyperbolization and transformed into supremacy. The isolation profile of sovereignty becomes at
the same time a dominant model (cf. [Kaczyński] believes in the nineteenth-century nation state. The most important for him is undivided sovereignty [...], which results from his fascination with the concepts of Carl Schmitt, the theoretician of the authoritarian and Nazi state. [...] Kaczyński does not believe in the concept of politics that the Americans call win-win, i.e. when each side of a dispute feels they have won (NS, 16/17); The reaction to decades of econocentrism is the return of ethnocentrism connecting Orbán, Kaczyński, Trump, etc. in the project of “the politics of sovereignty” organizing political action around such slogans as “Poland is the most important,” “America’s First,” “Greater Hungary” etc. (PL, 6/17); the true dimension of the Law and Justice project boils down to recreating Europe of sovereign chauvinisms (PL, 12/17); Who usually waved sovereignty? Those who violated human rights. [...] Such an attitude to sovereignty is another major element of the fascist state (PL, 2/17)). Sovereignty conceptualized as an advantage over other countries gains a negative mark due to references to nationalism, chauvinism, fascism—ideologies based on the conviction of the natural superiority of one’s own nation and contempt for other nations (Dubisz, 2003). An initial positive value is included in the group of names burdened with negative historical connotations. It is impossible not to see references to the psychological theory of narcissism, which, on a national and social basis, takes the form of megalomania. “A person with megalomaniac inclinations,” writes Pascal de Sutter, “ascribes extraordinary possibilities to himself,” and manifests “morbidly high self-esteem” (2009, p. 71).

Relations with the concept of narcissism can also be found in statements in which scholars consider the third aspect of sovereignty understood as isolation. The exclusive nature of this value manifests itself in an unambiguous and very negative assessment of the current and past status of sovereignty in the state, which can be expressed by the explanation of “our independence is in danger” or saying “a wolf is at our door”. While the first two aspects of the discussed profile were updated both in statements regarding Polish realities and in universal contexts in which publishers took up the issues of the core concept and its ontological status. The third subcategory is almost exclusively related to purely Polish matter. The linguistic picture of sovereignty assessed from a traditional point of view consists of the belief that it is a value that is highly endangered. Looking at entities hostile to us and striving to weaken Poland’s position in the international arena in other countries has its counterpart in psychology. Individuals with narcissistic tendencies are convinced that “all people not only look at them, but talk about them and even plot against them because of their uniqueness and significance” (Olchanowski & Sieradzan 2011, p. 20).

Right-wing narrative, in which sovereignty is conceptualized as a value at risk, contains three elements. The first is to indicate the dangers that threaten the narrative, sometimes the entities responsible for the (possible) attack on Polish sovereignty are identified and named (cf. the Prime Minister accused the opposition of an attack on Poland’s sovereignty (NS, 28/16); If we look at the disputeregarding the Constitutional Tribunal of Poland, we will see that it was not about the Tribunal, but about Poland’s subjectivity and sovereignty (WS, 17–18/17); The most political calculation was in the proceedings of the EC, which in joining the Chancellor Germany saw the opportunity to permanently break the sovereignty of Hungary and other Central European countries (DR, 32/16)), and at other times they are identified by hyperbole, war imagery or ellipse—and a picture of general threat and uncertainty is created (cf. everybody strives for our independence, for our sovereignty (NS, 30/16)). It is strengthened by a semantic lexicon—“aggression” and “oppression”: “to choke” / “to suppress” / “to break” / “to destroy sovereignty”; “attack on sovereignty”; “to lie and wait for sovereignty.”

The second component are statements built around the “recovery” category. Sovereignty is a value that must be recovered in Poland and such actions are taken by specific entities (cf. Poles
regain national consciousness and the nation sovereignty. [...] a similar opportunity facing Poland today may not be repeated for a long time (DR, 45/16); Returning to the idea of sovereignty means, in our case, a return to thinking in terms of a state whose construction after 1989 we actually neglected (DR, 8/17)). In these contexts one can find direct phrases, such as “restoring” / “regaining” (lost / destroyed) sovereignty, but also expressions which, due to presupposition, introduce into the text a judgment—“there was no sovereignty in Poland so far,” e.g. “a truly sovereign state,” “full sovereignty” or “desire / demand for sovereignty” (cf. Poland becomes again, after the PO rule, a truly sovereign state defending its interests (NS, 12/17); [Kaczyński] tries to lead the country into full sovereignty following the Sanation elite (DR, 42/16); If I were to mention something else that connects all those movements and events that strive for great change, I would point to the desire for sovereignty (DR, 8/17); The last elections are a great awakening of Poles and sovereignty (WS, 5/17)).

Thirdly, and within the isolation profile, the conviction that sovereignty is a value realized through the fight is emphasized, while there is no military clash in the reality of threat to the country’s independence and actual armed conflict, but the struggle that takes place here and now in defense of the threatened state independence (cf. the fight for freedom and sovereignty has not yet ended, obstacles are on it and will be ever greater (NS, 40/16); We must fight all the time, and actually defend this independence. We must fight for sovereignty. I use this word especially because it can be an independent state, but not a sovereign one (WS, 42/16)). In these contexts, the enemy against whom this important battle should be fought is never explicitly called, even if the third-person grammatical construction explicitly demands it. An example is the statement, which by the way perfectly presents the right-wing narrative of sovereignty constituted on the three pillars discussed: Can we be surprised that opponents of sovereign Poland will reach for every possible method? Sovereignty is not given away for free. You have to fight for sovereignty and independence. [...] Also in the 21st century, history did not end. For the first time since 1989, we have a chance for a truly sovereign state. [...] But let’s also be aware that it is a life and death battle. They will cast all their forces to stop change. They can even kill (WS, 27/16). Extremely suggestive war imagery, exponents of deontic modality and explicit hyperbolization give the quoted extract the character of a mobilization appeal. This, using the term by Michał Głowięński—the rhetoric of the besieged fortress (2009, p. 232)—is characteristic of right-wing discourse as such (Polkowska, 2015, pp. 70–95; Kłosińska, 2012, pp. 45–48), in the case of reflection however, regarding sovereignty becomes the basis for a particularly strong ennoblement of values. Culturally, goods in deficit or threatened with unavailability are assessed as more valuable and desirable (Cialdini, 2004, pp. 209–237).

A summary of the considerations on the isolation profile of sovereignty may be the proposal of a cognitive definition of value, which, in contrast to taxonomic explanations proposed in Polish dictionaries, also contains the connotative nature of the word being explained. The term was introduced by Jerzy Bartmiński, who explains it in the following way: “The cognitive definition takes the main purpose of the sentence from the way the subject is understood by the speakers of a given language, i.e. from the way of socially fixed and recognizable through language and using the language of world knowledge, categorization its phenomena, their characteristics, and evaluation” (2006, p. 42). Within the right-wing point of view, therefore, sovereignty is “a national value manifesting itself in the total decision-making independence of the state entity and its strong, dominant position on the international stage. Yet, it is considered to be at great risk.”
Cooperative Profile

The cooperative profile of sovereignty appears less frequently in contemporary weeklies, almost exclusively in liberal periodicals (*Polityka* and *Newsweek*) and is not as extensive as isolation profile. Categorizing the concept here is based on two aspects that researchers pay attention to. At the same time, they note that the understanding of it results from a modern perspective, which they often put in opposition to the traditional perspective, called the nineteenth-century one. Generally speaking, sovereignty within a liberal point of view is not, as in the previous model, “independence” but “subjectivity.” The latter should be understood literally, in opposition to the objective, instrumental treatment. Urszula Majer-Baranowska’s considerations seem to be extremely apt in this context: “The subject in relation to someone means that the subject is treated as an object of someone’s actions. If, as a result of these actions, the subject is not deprived of its / his attributes, dignity, sense of individuality, identity, activity, freedom, responsibility, then it / he is not subjectified” (2003, p. 251). One notes that such a conceptualization of the concept of sovereignty not only fundamentally differs from the one previously presented, but also significantly deviates from the picture of sovereignty that one finds in all dictionary definitions.

According to the liberal point of view, the foundation of sovereignty is harmony and cooperation within international relations. This conviction can be expressed with the explanation of “cooperation gives possibilities” or saying “joining forces can bring down even the best”. Within the cooperative profile, the entity’s total independence is not significant, which is manifested in independent decision-making on all spheres of statehood, while the effectiveness of the implemented solutions that are supposed to provide the state is important territorial, political, and economic security. The fundamental difference in approach is therefore to shift the focus from the methods used to their results, the teleological perspective replaces the methodological and functional—“how” is reformulated to “with what effect.” In other words, while a strong state position was a prerequisite for isolation sovereignty, cooperatively understood sovereignty is to make the state strong and stable.

A large part of statements in which sovereignty is understood in this way have been built around a lexicon from the semantic field of “cooperation.” Nouns like “cooperation,” “coalition,” “community,” “ally” appear, as well as “common,” “united,” “integrated” adjectives. They are contrasted with such lexemes and prepositional phrases as “lonely,” “solitary” or “alone.” A clear distribution of valuations, within which what is common is positively marked and what is isolated, negatively determines the liberal perspective that underlies the imaginary construct built on the relational understanding of sovereignty (cf. For rational and responsible patriots who want to maintain the sovereignty and independence of its peoples and states—there is no other way than a united and sovereign Europe (PL, 11/17); I do not believe that Kaczyński does not see the threat to Polish sovereignty in a disintegrated or weakened Union. For a “lonely” Poland, survival will be a gigantic challenge (PL, 9/17); we are still thinking in the nineteenth-century categories of a territorially limited state in which political sovereignty is based on a tripod of military, economic, and cultural sovereignty. All elements of this tripod are unstable today. No one can say that is able alone defend his country, even America needs a coalition (NS, 33/16); Prime Minister Szydło [...] says that Poland is a proud, sovereign country that has allies, but it clear as day that allies are missing, that Poland loses its sovereignty (NS, 47/16)).

In many contexts, publishers refer to the “equilibrium” category, which seems to be one of the overarching concepts within the cooperative profile. State security, which determines sovereignty, is to be based on it. The balance is considered on three planes, within three different types of interdependencies. First of all, it is important to balance the national and community interests—the realization of state benefits must not lead to weakening of the supranational
organization in which a given entity operates. Secondly, balance must also be maintained in the bilateral individual relations of state entities—the system of support and concessions should be reciprocal. The third area in which balanced coexistence becomes the foundation of national sovereignty is constituted by multilateral relations within a supranational community in which individual entities should occupy a similar position resulting from comparable rights and obligations (cf. Europe’s political systems were based on the idea of the sovereignty of states international subjectivity, [...] a way of cooperation that excluded the destruction of other statehoods, parts of the system. This strategic balance has undergone various crises [...], but it was within this system that it was possible to maintain states as permanent elements of the system, and not territories to be seized and destroyed (NS, 34/16); the idea of a Europe of sovereign nations that is popular with us is more and more like [...] the domain of geopolitics and national egoisms, not a circle [...] in which national interests are balanced by thinking on the stability of the entire EU structure (PL, 34/16); We just have to be ready to support other Member States where they in turn see their existential interests. To get, we have to give—it is this principle that PiS has the biggest problem with. This is most evident in the matter of the single currency and slogans like “We will not give up sovereignty” (PL, 11/17)). Therefore, while the isolation profile refers to the total independence of the state, in the cooperative model sovereignty is founded on the multifaceted relationships between various political entities, organized around the principle of balance.

The view on the fundamental role of balance maintained within the supranational community is directly related to the second aspect that can be distinguished as part of the cooperative profile based on the collected material. State sovereignty depends on the possibility of co-decision within the international organization to which the entity belongs. This idea can be expressed by means of explication “participation in deciding determines subjectivity” or more specifically, by saying “the absent are always in the wrong”. It is equality of participation in the decision-making process taking place at a supranational level that determines the real impact on strictly national reality, which is the quintessence of its sovereignty (cf. the Polish government, which constantly throws clichés about sovereignty, relinquishes that sovereignty, giving up co-creation of EU policy in the areas that concern us (PL, 11/17); the current government has an extremely incoherent attitude towards the Union. We cannot demand a common policy towards Russia and at the same time be a supporter of the minimalist Union, based only on the common market, we cannot fight for “Brussels subsidies” and at the same time undermine the competences of institutions such as the European Commission. [...] PiS [...] with its actions limits Poland’s sovereignty and its impact on the reality that surrounds us (PL, 11/17); for this reason, the sovereign states conduct foreign policy to present mutual expectations and try to agree them, sometimes starting from a diverging starting point (DR, 31/16)). In these contexts there are references to the peripheral category (clearly valued negatively, as opposed to being “in the middle” / “in the heart” / “in the center”), which is used polemically, it replaces the concept of sovereignty where it is used in a meta-textual way, as citing a foreign way of conceptualizing reality. In this way, the right-wing point of view is questioned and the own one based on a modern perspective is introduced (cf. There is still a strong stream of thinking in Poland which peripherality is confused with sovereignty. And we are still looking for a party or a politician who would play the role of the Polish Macron who would stand again the topic of Poland in the heart of Europe, not on its unstable peripheries (NS, 20/17)).

In the part of statements in which the liberal point of view is confirmed, there are phrases containing vocabulary from the semantic field of “loss”: “to limit sovereignty,” “to lose sovereignty,” “to relinquish sovereignty.” However, they are not numerous and repeatable.
enough to create a separate subcategory constituting the cooperative value model. However, this peculiar convergence of its pictures is noteworthy—despite the completely different profiling of the concept, the assessment of the real condition of contemporary Polish sovereignty can be very similar. This, it seems, may indicate the use of its name in an instrumental way, in a purely persuasive function.

In a nutshell, sovereignty conceptualized in a cooperative way is “the subjectivity of the state closely related to its multifaceted security, manifesting itself in the possibility of co-decision on equal terms within balanced cooperation with other states and supranational organizations.”

**Summary**

Two sovereignty profiles reconstructed on the basis of contemporary journalistic writing have a diametrically opposite character. They are based on two pictorial oppositions: independence-cooperation and dominance-balance. Although these oppositions are gradual (as demonstrated by language data, e.g. “partial independence,” “loose cooperation,” “less / more dominant,” “relative balance”), the material collected seems to contradict this. From the texts published in contemporary weeklies, binary oppositions emerge, devoid of indirect elements. Publishers display what separates them, not what can bring them closer. This bipolar conceptualization, supported by both sides, certainly affects the antagonistic nature of Polish public discourse.

The understanding of sovereignty in accordance with the isolation profile refers to the first dictionary definition of the lexeme—the concept is multifaceted and maximalist, it is not limited to the sphere of politics and strategic state decisions. The postulated separation is total, including territorial isolation. On the other hand, within the cooperative model, considerations about separateness or independence are completely neglected, and the categorization of sovereignty breaks diametrically with lexicographic tradition. It is even a model example of enantiosemization, i.e. “semantic and functional splitting of one and the same word into two opposing lexical, semantic, and axiological variants” (Chlebda, 2007, p. 92). As Wojciech Chlebda writes, characterizing the Polish communication space, “one and the same signs are capable of expressing opposing content, values and emotions” (2017, p. 8). The researcher also notes that two separate sub-discourses, which usually do not have many common features, in a simplified way they can be called right-wing and liberal—make up one Polish universal discourse (2017, p. 8). Therefore lexicographers, attempting to define the basic concepts of axiological nature, so susceptible to semantic modifications conditioned by professed beliefs, should take into account both perspectives, to reflect the entire complexity of the Polish axiosphere.

**Bibliography**


Laura Polkowska • Linguistic Profiling of the Concept of Sovereignty in Contemporary Weeklies