The Concept of Ocularcentrism & Photographic Models of Vision
From the Perspectives of Software Studies and Cultural Analytics Methods of Social Media Images and the Consumer Society Theory

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ABSTRACT

Scientific objective: The concept of ocularcentrism as the dominant ideology acts as a very important role within visual shaping photographic models of vision used by social media and photographic images. The paper focuses on the concept of ocularcentrism as the dominant effect of sight in visual culture, the problems of “ocularcentric discourse,” presented in forms of the “phono-logo-centrism” paradigm, and ocularcentric ways of seeing, or scopic regimes: “Cartesian perspectivalism,” the “Art of Describing,” “baroque vision,” and photographic models of vision that have been discussed in two theoretical contexts: Lev Manovich’s Software Studies and Cultural Analytics methods and Zygmunt Bauman’s consumer society theory that can be understood as the “embodied eye” and the “armed eye” concepts. Research methods: I suggest use of critical methods of Martin Jay’s Visual Studies in the perspective of the history of visuality from the ancient Greek to the philosophical, twentieth-century French thought, undertaking Software Studies and Cultural Analytics methods, in an analysis of the research project of Manovich’s “Phototrails,” as well as Bauman’s consumer society theory in an analysis of the photographic project of Alain Delorme’s “Totems.” Results and conclusions: I hope that exploring theoretical problems of visual culture will allow researchers to open a new field of reciprocal correspondence between the concept of ocularcentrism, photographic models of vision, Software Studies, and Cultural Analytics methods, as well as Bauman’s consumer society theory, based on possibility of coming to conclusions, posing questions, and hypotheses.
Cognitive value: The paper is an attempt to make a contribution to the hitherto unexplored research on the concept of ocularcentrism as the dominant effect of sight, subjecting to analysis the research project of Manovich’s “Phototrails,” in the perspective of Software Studies and Cultural Analytics methods within “media visualizations,” as well as the photographic project of Delorme’s “Totems,” in the perspective of Bauman’s consumer society theory, consumerism, consumption, and social exclusion.

KEYWORDS
Alain Delorme’s “Totems,” baroque vision, consumer society theory, Lev Manovich’s “Phototrails,” photographic models of vision, scopic regimes, the “armed eye”, the Art of Describing, the Cartesian perspectivalism, the concept of ocularcentrism, the “embodied eye”

The subject of this paper has been prepared based on my book about *Widzenie przez kulturę. Wprowadzenie do teorii kultury wizualnej [Seeing Through Culture: An Introduction to Visual Culture Theory]* in which ocularcentrism is discussed as the dominant ideology of visual culture. In one of the chapters (Chmielecki, 2018, pp. 215–223) of the largest part of this monograph entitled “Kulturowa teoria wizualności i widzenia” [“Cultural Theory of Visuality and Seeing”], ocularcentrism became an alternative for different ways of “seeing which establishes our place in the surrounding world” (Berger, 1990, p. 7). The title of my book refers to W.J.T. Mitchell’s *Seeing Through Race*, which is a collection of lectures on perceiving reality within “seeing through” or “seeing as.” In my research approach, culture is a social construct through which we observe specific phenomena, similarly like race, as Mitchell (2012) states,

“(…) is something we see through, like a frame, a window, a screen, or a lens, rather than something we look at. It is a repertoire of cognitive and conceptual filters through which forms of human otherness are mediated. It is also a costume, a mask, or a masquerade that can be put on, played upon, and disavowed. As such it is, of course, not exclusively a visual medium, but engages all the senses and signs that make human cognition, and especially recognition, possible” (pp. XII–XIII).

The title of the book, *Seeing Through Race*, could just as easily have been *Thinking Through Race*, but the dominance of visual metaphors in racial discourse made the emphasis on seeing, that has a long history as a synonym for understanding and knowing, plausible (Mitchell, 2012, p. XIII). From this viewpoint, Nicholas Mirzoeff begins the discussion about seeing as an activity we do, and we are continually learning how to do it, as seeing still is changing, making the point that we do not just see with our eyes, but also with our brains. In the following part, Mirzoeff (2016) states that

“Seeing the world is not about how we see but about what we make of what we see. We put together an understanding of the world that makes sense from what we already know or think we know. It has long been realized that we do not see exactly what there is to be seen” (pp. 71–72).

From my perspective, a visual metaphor of “seeing through” or “seeing as” that was borrowed from *Philosophical Investigations*, where Ludwig Wittgenstein (2009) writes, about this seeing formula, is that when

“I see the figure as a box’ means: I have a particular visual experience which I have found that I always have when I interpret the figure as a box or when I look at a box. But if it meant this I ought
to know it. I ought to be able to refer to the experience directly, and not only indirectly (As I can speak of red without calling it the colour of blood)” (pp. 193–194).

In this theoretical approach, seeing can be referred not only to the figure, as Wittgenstein put it, but also to the surrounding reality, and it comes from a formulation which means how people understand the reality, meaning, how they perceive it, and how they think about its conceptual aspects available for the human beings within the visual thinking process.

Michel Foucault (2002), a French philosopher, in the first chapter of The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, makes one of the most known analyses of the famous painting Las Meninas (1656) by Diego Velázquez (1599–1660) in which he claims that

“(…) the painter’s gaze, addressed to the void confronting him outside the picture, accepts as many models as there are spectators; in this precise but neutral place the observer and the observed take part in a ceaseless exchange. No gaze is stable, or rather, in the neutral furrow of the gaze piercing at a right angle through the canvas, subject and object, the spectator and the model, reverse their roles to infinity” (p. 5).

According to Foucault, the observer and the spectator, who are looking at Velázquez’s painting have been engaged in the “visibility game” and the “dialectics of the gaze.” For this reason, it has ceased to be clear who is seeing, who can be seen, who is representing, who can be represented, who is creating an artwork, and who can be created in an artwork. The painter’s gaze rests on the model, but at the same time, it is addressed towards the spectator, because Foucault’s study enters into the correspondence between the represented and the unrepresented reality. The spectator has been drawn into a network of interrelated gazes and the structure of mutual references within “(…) classical pictorial representation, (in which, note K.C.) objects are represented under their visual aspects, and a crucial element in their representation is a visual resemblance between the representation and the thing represented (…)” (Searle, 1980, p. 481). For this reason, Foucault (2002) argues that “He sees his invisibility made visible to the painter and transposed into an image forever invisible to himself” (p. 6). On the one hand, Foucault’s interpretation presents the major problem of spectator mode, on the other hand, the significance of the painter’s gaze corresponds with the concept of ocularcentrism as the dominant effect of sight which occurs not only within contemporary visual culture. In this sense, European thought has continued to privilege sight as the means of access to the painter’s gaze, and

“The spectacle he is observing is thus doubly invisible: first, because it is not represented within the space of the painting, and, second, because it is situated precisely in that blind point, in that essential hiding-place into which our gaze disappears from ourselves at the moment of our actual looking” (Foucault, 2002, p. 4),

but it has been situated in the perspective of increasing meaning of sight.
The Concept of Ocularcentrism as the Domination Effect of Sight

The dominant effect of sight in contemporary visual culture manifests itself on many levels. First, we are living in a “global village” in which we derive satisfaction from primal instincts taken by images and visual communication. Second, the proliferation of visual stimuli becomes an everyday visual experience within which functions a “consumer society” (Bauman, 1998; 2004; 2007) and the “society of the spectacle” (Debord, 1995). Third, an everyday visual experience has also been associated within the phenomena of “visual consumption” of images in mass media.
(Schroeder, 2002), recording, and disseminating them via social media platforms, iPads, and iPhones, as well as colonizing new areas of visuality by new media, digital models of vision, and high-definition screens in public urban space (Sendyka, 2012, p. 141). Piotr Sztompka (2005), in *Socjologia wizualna. Fotografia jako metoda badawcza [Visual Sociology: Photography as The Research Method]*, provides plenty of evidence confirming the described status of contemporary visual culture in a social perspective, and he also claims that

“(…) our world is more and more showing, spectacular. This is expressed in a twofold way. First of all, the surroundings of our social life are overcrowded with images (visual representations) of all kinds, and second, perceptible aspects (visual manifestations) of the world surrounding us are more expressive, varied, and richer than ever. In other words, it increases the figurativeness of our surroundings (social reality – note K.C.)” [translated by K. Chmielecki] (p. 11).

Ocularcentrism is an effect of the functioning of a dominant ideology, defined by the sphere of *Ways of Seeing* that are referred to in an essay by John Berger (1990). Within all images: both sensual, as well as and those made with the use of optical devices, based on the technique of mechanical reproduction, also including photography, which in this case has been treated as the “medium of seeing,” inextricably associated with ocularcentrism as a philosophical view that has been introduced in the reference to some cultures dominated by visual experience and the sense of sight (Jay, 1994, p. 3). This term has been proposed by Martin Jay who in *Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French Thought*, gives evidence of a particular privileging, and the dominant effect of sight, as well as the obvious advantage of images obtained by sight in the visual society. In contemporary times the critique of ocularcentrism finds just another confirmation in the issues associated with the technological mediation of audio-visual culture. Jay begins a discussion about ocularcentrism from Plato to Descartes, then considers its role in the French Enlightenment thought, and finally begins thinking about the status of sight in contemporary and postmodern culture. In the 20th century French philosophy, *Downcast Eyes* is the most comprehensive treatment of visuality and vision currently available, that arouses controversies and discussions in the humanities and social sciences and strengthens Jay’s reputation as one of the most important contemporary visual theorists who constructs a new history of visuality.

![Figure 2](https://vcult200journal.files.wordpress.com/2014/03/chapter4_21.jpg)

*Fig. 2. The diagram of eyes comes from René Descartes’ seeing theory that was published in “Treatise on Man” (1686). It is a woodcut coming from Descartes’ *Principles of Philosophy* (1644). Descartes believed that light rays impressed particles into the eyes. The image was transmitted to the pineal gland which served as the nexus between mind and body establishing the relationship between visual perception and muscular action in return. (Figure 2) comes from *Discourse on Method, Optics, Geometry, and Meteorology* by Descartes (2001, p. 85) and it is available at the website: https://vcult200journal.files.wordpress.com/2014/03/chapter4_21.jpg*
In this regard, beginning with Plato’s dialogues from *The Republic*, sight acquired the privilege of “the noblest of the senses,” which has also been repeated in *Optics* by René Descartes (2001), who writes bluntly that “All the management of our lives depends on the senses, and since that of sight is the most comprehensive and the noblest of these, there is no doubt that the inventions which serve to augment its power are among the most useful that there can be” (p. 85). In ancient Greek, medieval, and Renaissance philosophy it was also believed that sight was “the noblest of the senses.” This belief stemmed from Aristotelian, Neo-Platonic, and mystical thought. Aristotle (1991) claimed in the *Metaphysics* that sight was dominating over all other senses, because “Of all the senses, sight best helps us to know things, and reveals many distinctions” (p. 980). For this reason, sight, contemplation, and philosophy are corresponded. Other philosophers referred to Aristotle in defending their arguments. Plato (2008) declared sight to be the most important of the senses due to its connection with the human mind and the soul (p. 173). Citing Plato (2008), Western philosophers often wrote about “the eye of the soul,” and “the eye of the mind,” or “the light of reason” (p. 527); they also associated sight with an epistemological ambiguity which was laying at the origins of ocularcentrism and the most noble pursuits for human beings. In addition, other prominent early modern figures, such as Leonardo da Vinci and Galilei Galileo agreed that sight was “the noblest of the senses.” Da Vinci (1956) believed eyesight to be the principal means by which humans see, perceive, and appreciate the infinite works of nature (p. 23). Galileo (1957) analyzed the sense of sight in *The Assayer* where he stated that it was the “most excellent and noble of the senses” (p. 255).

![Descartes optics theory](https://martynjolly.files.wordpress.com/2015/09/descartes-optics.jpg)

Fig. 3. Descartes optics theory. An artwork. This eye diagram – an illustration comes from *Optics* (French: *La Dioptrique*, 1637) first published by René Descartes. Three external points are depicted on the retina at the bottom of the eye. The light rays from these three points have been focused on the retina by the structures of the lens at the front of the eye. The image formed on the retina is being observed by the homunculus,—a human figure that is used by representation of the human brain process during an image interpretation. (Figure 3) comes from *Discourse on Method, Optics, Geometry, and Meteorology* by Descartes (2001, p. 96) and it is available at the website: https://martynjolly.files.wordpress.com/2015/09/descartes-optics.jpg
Martin Jay used Plato’s Allegory of the Cave for illustrating the concept of ocularcentrism, based on which he came to the conclusion that ideas can be seen revealing the truth, and the chains that prevent prisoners from leaving the cave are worldly things. Prisoners, who have never seen anything else, are convinced that the shadows projected on the walls of the cave are the reality. However, these shadows are the prisoners’ reality but not a representation of the reality. Plato’s attitude lead Jay (1994) to the conclusion that visuality in Western culture has always had an ambiguous status, which in an epistemological approach consists of distinguishing between the subject and the observed object, and also between reality and the observed reality. This idea had appeared in Greek philosophy, from Parmenides to Plato (p. 475). Jay refers to the apparatus theory by Jean-Louis Baudry (1974/1975), who argued that the mechanisms of a cinematic representation are ideological, because films are created to represent reality (pp. 39–47). Jay (1994) makes the distinction between the privileged senses in Greek and Hebrew culture. For the Greeks, it is sight, and for the Jews, it is hearing. Parmenides would not have created the concept of unchanging and perfect being if it had not been for the inspiration of sight that embraced many things at once (p. 24).

Fig. 4. Plato’s Allegory of the Cave by Jan Saenredam, according to the drawing of Cornelis van Haarlem (1604), the Albertina Museum in Vienna. The allegory of the cave was presented by the Greek philosopher Plato in his work of The Republic (514–520) which is written as a dialogue between Plato’s brother Glaucon and Socrates, narrated by Plato. (Figure 4) is available at https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Platon_Cave_Saenredam_1604.jpg
According to Jay (1991), “The tenacious hold of ocularcentrism over Western culture was abetted by the oscillation among models of speculation, observation and revelation” (p. 23). However, ocularcentrism manifests itself in Western culture in two ways: the privileging of vision does not always mean the privileging of the sense of sight itself. In the critique of ocularcentrism, it is also about taking notice of a certain metaphoricity in an epistemological discourse. Jay (1994) writes that

“For if vision could be construed as either the allegedly pure sight of perfect and immobile forms with ‘the eye of the mind’ or as the impure but immediately experienced sight of the actual two eyes, when one of these alternatives was under attack, the other could be raised in its place. In either case, something called vision could still be accounted the noblest of the senses. As we will note in the case of Cartesian philosophy, it was precisely this creative ambiguity that lay at the origins of modern ocularcentrism” (p. 29).

This presented aspect manifests in an epistemological dualism at the level of metaphoricity of language. In this sense, it seems important, not only a primacy of the physical sense of sight, but also seeing without the need for eyes, as in the case of theoretical concepts (seeing with the mind’s eye). Jay (1994) argues that ocularcentrism manifests itself at different historical moments when one of two elements: “the physical eye” or “the eye of the mind” is criticized. However, when culture marginalizes one of these options, it promotes the other at the same time, thus maintaining the dominant status of ocularcentrism (pp. 33–36).

The idea of the incarnation of Jesus Christ promoted in the Middle Ages shows a body that can be seen that strengthened ocularcentrism. The interpretation of the Old Testament was changed in the first centuries of Christianity, within the metaphoricity of language, from the Hebrew “hearing” to the Greek “sight.” Whereas, in the New Testament appeared the statement that “God is light,” which takes notice of the symbolic meaning of seeing in religious worship. Jay (1994) connected ocularcentrism with a medieval metaphor of light in which we have a distinction between two types of light: lumen (the Platonic light of the soul) and lux (the light perceived by the human eyes). Similarly, the development of medieval optics and central perspective theory was associated with the sense of sight and with architecture, in which sacred buildings in the full spectrum of visible light were erected (pp. 35–37).

From a philosophical viewpoint, Jay (1994) states that

“The development of Western philosophy cannot be understood, it bears repeating, without attending to its habitual dependence on visual metaphors of one sort or another. From the shadows playing on the wall of Plato’s cave and Augustine’s praise of the divine light to Descartes’s ideas available to a ‘steadfast mental gaze’ and the Enlightenment’s faith in the data of our senses, the ocularcentric underpinnings of our philosophical tradition have been undeniably pervasive. Whether in terms of speculation, observation, or revelatory illumination, Western philosophy has tended to accept without question the traditional sensual hierarchy. And if (Richard, note K.C.) Rorty’s argument about the ‘mirror of nature’ is right, modern Western thinkers in particular have built their theories of knowledge even more resolutely on a visual foundation” (pp. 186–187).

The arguments presented by Jay may lead to the conclusion that visual culture has been treated as ocularcentric, that is one in which sight enables the birth of visual experiences, perceived by humans and then being interpreted by them. The ocularcentric culture manifests itself within a paradigm of “phono-logo-centrism” that treats “about ‘visualising’ culture attests to this point,” in which a cognition in visual culture “begins from visual forms,” through theorizing as well as building theoretical concepts and models, to attempts to “achieve understanding of those forms
through mental constructs” (Jenks, 1995, p. 1). This paradigm proposed by Jacques Derrida who argued that “The defense was aimed at thwarting the totalizing effects of what might be called, in the spirit of deconstructionist neologizing, ‘phallogocularcentrism’” (Jay, 1994, p. 494). In Of Grammatology, and the concept of deconstruction, Derrida (2016) made the critique of logocentrism (pp. 43–49). The adoption of this assumption made an image notion become fundamental both to all media and the epistemology concept. No wonder then that the theorists identifying themselves with Media Studies, in the approach presented by Marshall McLuhan (1994), treated visual media: photography, film, television, video, the Internet, and virtual reality as the “extensions of the human senses,” (pp. 7–21) which in a consequence of digitization led to questioning the ocularcentrism of visual culture. Chris Jenks (1995) claims that sight alone provides access to the outside reality, what became the reason for which visual abilities have been equated with mental abilities (pp. 16–24). This epistemological equating has far-reaching consequences in the concept of scopic regimes, borrowed from Christian Metz’s terminology (Metz, 1982, p. 61) that Martin Jay (2013) presented in Scopic Regimes of Modernity (pp. 114–133). Rudolf Arnheim (2004) in Visual Thinking argued that the basic processes of seeing and visual perception of reality are involved in the typical thinking mechanisms that take place in the sense of sight (pp. 15–17).

Edyta Stawowczyk (2002), in O widzeniu, mediach i poznaniu. Stłuczone lustra rzeczywistości [About Seeing, Media, and Cognition: The Broken Mirrors of Reality], writes that

“The increasing role of visibility in contemporary culture is associated with technological transformations. Nowadays, the technologies determine specific orders of seeing, and therefore they provide new ways of giving meanings to the world. (…) Computers, which are able to record more data than a human, become the most important device of perception. Tomaso Poggio, an expert in the field of ‘vision’ computers at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, claims that unlike people, the perceptive abilities of computers are endless. One of the new media theorists Paul Virilio (1994) proclaims the coming age of visionics, a synthetic ‘sightless vision,’ a triumph of ‘the industrialisation of the non-gaze’ (blindness) (pp. 59–77). The situation looks paradoxical: as expanding the scope of visibility widens, we turn away from the idea of world cognition helped by the senses, and we turn to models and mechanisms themselves of visual information processing (of analog-neural patterns). Régis Debray (1992), a French theorist, proves that we enter the era of the videosphere which characterizes the order of visibility associated with the visionary image (visionnée) in contrast to an image that is directly related to seeing and the order of representation (belonging to the previous era of the graphosphere). The visionary image patterned on analog-neural information processing by a human, has currently become a model of all possible scientific information” [translated by K. Chmielecki] (pp. 42–43).

Jay (2013) distinguished three ocularcentric ways of seeing or scopic regimes that he defined as “the competing ocular fields in the modern era” (p. 115). The first of them is the “Cartesian subject” and the mathematical formula of central perspective described by Leon Battista Alberti in On Painting (1991). This model is close to the physical approach to vision that has caused the concept of visual representation to be dominated by visual culture and it was called “Cartesian perspectivalism” that is characterized by the privileging of rationalism. The Cartesian subject took the position of the absolute, bodiless, and “divine eye,” objectively taken out of context and narrative (Friedberg, 2006, pp. 50–56). The term used by Norman Bryson uses of “the logic of the gaze,” which is making a point of view outside of the observer, bodiless, and abstractly cold. The “Founding Perception,” as Bryson (1986) put it, is a metaphorical “absolute eye” in the center, whose all lines from the observed object converge in one point of view (pp. 93–150). The
mechanism of this model was described, in *Perspective as Symbolic Form* by Erwin Panofsky (1991), who writes that

“In order to guarantee a fully rational—that is, infinite, unchanging and homogeneous—space, this ‘central perspective’ makes two tacit but essential assumptions: first, that we see with a single and immobile eye, and second, that the planar cross section of the visual pyramid can pass for an adequate reproduction of our optical imagination. In fact, these two premises are rather bold abstractions from reality, if by ‘reality’ we mean the actual subjective optical impression. For the structure of an infinite, unchanging and homogeneous space – in short, a purely mathematical space – is quite unlike the structure of psychophysiological space…” (pp. 28–30).

The second ocularcentric ways of seeing, discussed by Jay, was called “the Art of Describing.” It is a variant of the Cartesian model situated in opposition to it. Describing this model, Jay refers to Svetlana Alpers’s *The Art of Describing: Dutch Art in the Seventeenth Century*. Its realization can be found in philosophical treatises by Francis Bacon and Dutch Golden Age painting. “The mapping impulse” that characterizes this model was borrowed from Alpers (1983, pp. 119–168). In this viewpoint, Jay (2013) argues that “If there is a model for Dutch art, it is the map with its unapologetically flat surface and its willingness to include words as well as objects in its visual space” (p. 124). For two reasons, the “Art of Describing” was a harbinger of later models of vision no matter to what extent it was subordinated to Cartesian perspectivalism. First, Alberti’s system can hardly be considered as filiatory in relation to modernist art (Alberti, 1991); Dutch art was more likely its predecessor. Second, the “Art of Describing” is also an anticipation of the visual experience given by photography. This situation is particularly evident in the example of the parallelism of photography and the anti-perspectivism of impressionist art. Alpers (1983) claims that Dutch painting of the seventeenth century has been associated with seeing theory. As an example, in support of her thesis, she mentions the invention of *camera obscura*, which linked Johannes Vermeer’s (who used it) painting mode, with photography (pp. 30–32; 240–241). In this sense, the painting, similarly like a photographic image, has been inseparably associated with ways of depicting an object that has been subordinated to the painter’s perception. From his viewpoint, Jay (2013) argues that “(…) this last observation so suggestive is the opening it provides for a consideration of an alternative scopic regime that may be understood as more than a subvariant of Cartesian perspectivalism,” (p. 123) that was borrowed from Alpers’s perspective of the Dutch painting of the seventeenth century presented in *The Art of Describing*.

The third of ocularcentric ways of seeing was called “baroque vision” that initiates a game with the spectator’s habits and tries to present what is unrepresented itself. This model also gives birth to the “gaze of melancholy” that Walter Benjamin (1988) recognized as the characteristic feature for the aesthetics of baroque allegory (pp. 183–184). However, this model is not present only in the baroque times, it can also be seen in the contemporary period, because it is present permanently in the (post)modern age. The diagnosis made seems accurate in the times when we are here talking about an “images flood” that seems to be characterized by the contemporary age of the proliferation of visuality (See Ndalianis, 2004, pp. 1–30). Describing this model, in a philosophical context, Jay (2013) refers to Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s monadology and Blaise Pascal’s meditations (p. 130). For Buci-Glucksmann (2013) baroque vision has been located in the opposition to Cartesian perspectivalism, that cannot be seen as a correlate of Leibniz’s pluralism of monadic viewpoints as unclear, unreadable, ambiguous, and open (p. 80). Baroque vision emphasized the inextricable relationship between rhetoric and visibility that caused those images to become signs, and concepts contained an irreducibly pictorial component itself. It is also worth taking notice of the tactility and touchiness of baroque vision as well as
its return to corporeality, as visual experience which prevents its transforming into Cartesian perspectivalism. The body returns in baroque vision to refute the bodiless gaze that occurred in Cartesian perspectivalism (Jay, 2013, pp. 130–131). Jay (2013) does believe that the scopic regime that has acquired full awareness in our times could be called “the madness of vision” identified with baroque vision (p. 131). Jay (2013) referred to Christine Buci-Glucksmann (1994), who called baroque vision in the most expressive way, and he claims that “in the postmodern discourse that elevates the sublime to a position of superiority over the beautiful, it is surely the ‘palimpsests of the unseeable’ (…)” (p. 131). This last statement was borrowed from Buci-Glucksmann (2013, pp. 94–113).

**Photographic Images in the Perspectives of the “Embodied Eye” and the “Armed Eye”**

In her book, *Foto-oko. Wizja fotograficzna wobec okularocentryzmu w sztuce pierwszej połowy XX wieku* [Photo-eye. A Photographic Vision Facing the Ocularcentrism in the Art of the First Half of the 20th Century] Dorota Łuczak combines the concept of ocularcentrism with photography, pointing out photographic visions i.e., the “embodied eye” and the “armed eye” (See Łuczak, 2018, pp. 61–204). In this research *modus operandi*, these concepts awakened my particular interest, because mentioned photographic visions may be referred to photographic models of vision that I described in the second part of this essay. Jonathan Crary, in his book, *Suspensions of Perception: Attention, Spectacle, and Modern Culture*, criticized the trend of the development of Visual Culture Studies. Because too often, “seeing” located in it has been reduced to an autonomous and self-telic concept, which results in simplification, schematism, and repeatability of conclusions. Devoting his consideration to the title “attention” and becoming “suspension of perception” at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the author declared in an “Introduction” that this topic goes beyond the issue of

“attention, as a constellation of texts and practices, is much more than a question of the gaze, of looking, of the subject only as a spectator. It allows the problem of perception to be extracted from an easy equation with questions of visuality, and (…) the modern problem of attention encompasses a set of terms and positions that cannot be construed simply as questions of opticality” (Crary, 2001, p. 2),

and thus frees it from the ocularcentric discourse. Crary (1996) emphasizes that the consideration on visuality then shifted from the bodiless and stable order of the *camera obscura* to the physiologically ambiguous human eye. The body and the perceived object became inseparable, and the “act of seeing” was inscribed in the subjective experience of an individual (pp. 5–9). According to Crary, photography invented in 1839, does not play any considerable role in this upheaval. First, this happened because of the chronology of events. Second, photography realized an “act of seeing” analogous to the model known from the descriptions of the *camera obscura* (pp. 30–32). By making the reflection on the invention of photography as a starting point, it is difficult, however, to marginalize the perspectives of “subjective vision and the separation of the senses” that Crary (1996) described in *Techniques of the Observer: On Vision and Modernity in the Nineteenth Century* (pp. 67–96) and not refer that to the concept of ocularcentrism.

In *Practices of Looking: An Introduction to Visual Culture*, Lisa Cartwright and Marita Sturken (2017) enunciated the concept in which currently the search for the sanctioned “surveillance gaze” takes place by photographic images (pp. 109–113). In this viewpoint, researchers quote *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, where Michel Foucault (1995) presented the model of exercising power and control methods on “the basis of a political technology of the
body,” which is a fundamental thesis of this work presenting “in what way (assujettissement that is, note K.C.) a specific mode of subjection was able to give birth to man (sujet, subject, note K.C.) as an object of knowledge for a discourse with a ‘scientific’ status” (p. 24). Cartwright and Sturken refer to the concept of “the docile bodies” introduced by Foucault (1995) who wrote about it that

“The human body was entering a machinery of power that explores it, breaks it down and rearranges it. A ‘political anatomy’, which was also a ‘mechanics of power’, was being born; it defined how one may have a hold over others’ bodies, not only so that they may do what one wishes, but so that they may operate as one wishes, with the techniques, the speed and the efficiency that one determines. Thus, discipline produces subjected and practiced bodies, ‘docile’ bodies” (p. 138).

Fig. 5. An elevation, section, and plan of Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon prison, in an architectural drawing by Willey Reveley from 1791. (Figure 5) comes from Jeremy Bentham (2001), The Works of Jeremy Bentham, ed. John Bowring, Vol. IV, (pp. 172–173) and it is available at the website: https://reversepanoptic.wordpress.com/2014/10/22/jeremy-bentham-the-works-of-jeremy-bentham-vol-4-panopticon-constitution-colonies-codification-1843
Cartwright and Sturken (2017) think that the disciplinary procedures make the “surveillance gaze” for biopower (pp. 109–113) and refer to Foucault’s concept of the “docile bodies” in which the bodies are operating in the disciplinary institutions: prisons, hospitals, factories, military regiments, and schools. To construct the “docile bodies,” disciplinary institutions must be able to constantly observe the bodies under control and ensure the internalization of disciplinary individuality in these bodies. It means that a discipline must take place without undue force by putting the bodies under control into proper form by careful observation methods (Foucault, 1995, pp. 135–169). It requires a specific form of institution an example of which is Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon. Cartwright and Sturken (2017) claim that “Photographic images have been instrumental in the modern state’s production of what Foucault calls ‘docile bodies’—citizens who uphold a society’s ideologies and laws by participating in an economy of discipline, internalizing conformity, and improving themselves as a way to maintain the state” (p. 112). In this viewpoint, photographic images have been commonly used by popular visual culture which results in the popularization of a visual understanding of the reality surrounding us and a sensory information from this environment, which reveals itself as conceptualizing abstract concepts (Mitchell, 1994, pp. 59–60). Photographic images produce homogeneous images for us, which function as “ideological texts” making our identity and self/image (See Jones, 2006). This means that aesthetic norms and standards of “beauty” that these images establish, such as a desired look and a thin body type are the part of “normalizing gaze” that the spectators turn on themselves (Cartwright & Sturken, 2009, pp. 110–111).

Fig. 6. A photographic advertising image on the cover of “GQ magazine,” an international monthly men’s fashion magazine, based in New York City, depicting Michel Foucault’s “docile bodies” in the context of shaping our bodies, physical activity, and body fitness. (Figure 6) is available at the website: http://stylediary1.blogspot.com/2016/01/cristiano-ronaldo-body-cover-gq.html?spref=pi. (Figure 7) depicting Victoria’s Secret changing the controversial ‘the Perfect Body’ slogan which is far from perfect. (Figure 7) is available at the website: https://www.mic.com/articles/103474/now-this-is-the-kind-of-underwear-ad-women-can-feel-good-about.
The special role of technology will be noticed and appreciated when the visualization has been referred to a specific “arming of the eye.” It is about technological improvement of our visual abilities and minimizing the importance of various physiological and cognitive imperfections within the seeing process. Contrary to appearances, this is not a new phenomenon, although its earlier examples had a slightly different character, they were also concerned about “vision improvement,” which was aimed at getting rid of subjectivity and making what you see more credible. These include attempts at more and more accurate mapping of views of the world by help of the camera obscura used in the laws of optics. Nineteenth-century technologies fulfilled a similar role: thaumatrope, stereoscope and photoplasticon. Their operation consisted in such organizing images that could be, e.g., to set them in motion or give a three-dimensional impression (See Cray 1996). The second way of understanding ocularcentrism refers already not to the images themselves, but to the processes of seeing, and is associated with the anti-essentialist belief that visuality “is” not so much, rather how much it “becomes” when some objects / situations are experienced by the sense of sight (See Bal, 2006, pp. 5–32). Thus, the contextuality of visuality, its variability within various social processes, is of key importance here. This form of ocularcentrism results from the common tendency to visualization, i.e., expanding the scope of visibility and visual culture. A perfect example of this is photography aesthetics coexisting with both visual culture and the process of seeing and ocularcentrism itself. Łukasz Rogowski claims that “seeing practices are the most important element of visual culture,” which “concerns not only images, two- or three-dimensional representations (including photography, note K.C.) and how they are produced and presented” in the seeing process (Rogowski, 2014, p. 12).

Gillian Rose (2016) claims that

“Photography is an obvious example: an analogue photograph is created by light falling onto chemicals which react to that light to produce a visual pattern. Whether we are looking at an image of a leaf made by leaving that leaf on a sheet of light-sensitive paper in the sunshine, or at a famous photograph (...) taken with a relatively complex single lens reflex camera, they are both analogue photographs because both have a direct, physical relationship to a continuous pattern of light generated by objects” (p. 5).

In this viewpoint, photography inextricably links to ocularcentrism, in three aspects. First of all, photography as a medium of seeing indicates the dominance of sight within a cultural determinant of the seeing process. Second, photography thanks to the development of “techniques of the observer” using the “armed eye,” in which the main role is not so much the technique itself, but its way of use in the seeing process associated with ocularcentrism. Third, photography also realizes the “embodied eye” concept, wherein vision is the function of corporeal processes leading to the subordination of perceiving and photographic vision which is demonstrated also in the ocularcentrism process.
Fig. 8. An illustration depicting the *camera obscura* principle, engraving from Athanasius Kircher’s seminal 1646 treatise on light and shadow entitled *Ars magna lucis et umbrae* (*The Great Art of Light and Shadow*), that was published in Rome by Hermann Scheus. Explaining the *camera obscura* principle, an illustration associated the image and the shadow with the artist who to see his image before he yet draws it. (Figure 8) is available at https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:1646_Athanasius_Kircher___Camera_obscura.jpg

The Research Project of Lev Manovich’s Team “Phototrails” in the Perspectives of Software Studies and Cultural Analytics Methods

The conceptualization of social media as “identity media” has also appeared in the research project of “Phototrails” by Lev Manovich (2013, pp. 329–341; 2017, pp. 71–113; 2020, pp. 187–206) and his team. Regarding the subject of my research, I propose that Manovich’s findings within Software Studies and Cultural Analytics methods as a starting point are accepted. Manovich created “media visualizations” of Instagram photos into many collections as part of his Software Studies. Lev Manovich’s findings are depicting an interesting perspective of Social Media Theory in the field of Visual Culture Studies. The central problem in this research is an attempt to define the visual aspects of Social Media Studies and determine the current state of knowledge on this subject. The research project of Manovich and his team is available at the Phototrails official website: www.phototrails.net which uses photographic images uploaded by Instagram users, and the social “media visualizations” to explore visual structures for big data photos. The research of Manovich’s team was the first academic experiment to analyze and visualize Instagram’s big data repositories. Nadav Hochman and Manovich (2013) claimed that in “Zooming into an Instagram City: Reading the Local Through Social Media,” published in the open-access, peer-reviewed, and on-line journal *First Monday* http://www.firstmonday.org, they conducted the research within

“the analysis of the popular mobile photo-sharing application Instagram. First, we (analyzed, note K.C) the affordances provided by the Instagram interface and the ways of the application’s tools structure users’ understanding and use of the ‘Instagram medium.’ Next, we (compared, note K.C.)
the visual signatures of 13 different global cities using 2.3 million Instagram photos from these cities. Finally, we (used, note K.C.) spatio–temporal visualizations of over 200,000 Instagram photos uploaded in Tel Aviv, Israel over three months to show how they can offer social, cultural and political insights about people’s activities in particular locations and time periods.”

Fig. 9. a) (left) Sample photographic images uploaded by twenty-four Instagram users, six images from each of them have been shown. Images come from eight countries: Vietnam, China, Japan, Korea, Hong Kong, Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. b) (right) Some of these images are depicted at a larger size as a full-size version in their montage of (figure 9b) that is available at the website: https://www.flickr.com/photos/culturevis/2706411290/sizes/l. (Figure 9a and figure 9b) come from *Instagram and Contemporary Image* an e-book by Lev Manovich (2017, pp. 6, 75) that is available at Manovich’s website: http://manovich.net/index.php/projects/instagram-and-contemporary-image. Photographic images have been used courtesy of Lev Manovich.

The “Phototrails” was a collaborative research project between Hochman (PhD candidate in Art History at the University of Pittsburgh), Manovich (a Presidential Professor at the Graduate Center at the City University of New York, and the Director of the Cultural Analytics Lab), and Jay Chow (the Master of Science in an interdisciplinary informatics, the bachelor’s in fine arts at the University of California in San Diego, and the researcher of Software Studies Initiative). Manovich’s team has made quantitative analyses, and “media visualizations” to the research of visual big data, and photo collections within Software Studies and Cultural Analytics methods organized by different visual criteria: for example, hue (radius) or uploaded time (perimeter).
Fig 10. Radial image plot visualization of 33 292 photos uploaded to Instagram in Tel Aviv during 20–26 April 2012. The photos are sorted by hue (radius) and upload time (perimeter). A higher resolution version of (Figure 10) is available at the Phototrails website: http://phototrails.net/visualizations/ radial-visualization. Manovich’s team used high–resolution visualizations that show complete image sets to enable the exploration of the photos’ metadata (upload dates, filters used, spatial coordinates), patterns created by the content of the photographs, and the examination of individual photographs. (Figure 10) comes from the on-line paper of Nadav Hochman and Lev Manovich (2013) “Zooming into an Instagram City: Reading the Local Through Social Media” that is available at the First Monday website: https://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/4711/3698. Radial image plot visualization has been used courtesy of Lev Manovich.
Fig. 11. Radial plot visualizations of 50,000 image samples organized by a different visual attribute. Top left: San Francisco – brightness means (radius) and hue mean (perimeter). Top right: Tokyo—brightness means (radius) and hue mean (perimeter). Bottom left: New York City—hue median (radius) and brightness mean (perimeter). Bottom right: Bangkok – hue median (radius) and brightness mean (perimeter). Higher resolution versions of these visualizations are available at the Phototrails website: http://phototrails.net/instagram-cites. In (figure 11) Manovich’s team compared radial plot visualizations of cities in different visual criteria: New York City and Bangkok images organized by brightness mean (radius) and hue mean (perimeter) as well as San Francisco and Tokyo images organized by hue median (radius) and brightness mean (perimeter). (Figure 11) comes from the paper of Nadav Hochman and Lev Manovich (2013) “Zooming into an Instagram City…” Radial plot visualizations have been used courtesy of Lev Manovich.
Fig. 12–13. Montage visualizations comparing Instagram photos shared over four consecutive twenty-four-hour periods in two cities. 4,000 random photo samples from Bangkok (figure 12 – top) and Berlin (figure 13 – bottom). In each montage the photos are sorted by average hue (left to right, top to center). Higher resolution versions of these (figure 12 and figure 13) are available at the Phototrails website: http://phototrails.net/visualizations/montage-visualizations.

(Figure 14) is a further close-up of the montage visualization that shows photographs of fireworks taken during Independence Day celebrations.
(Figure 15) is a higher resolution version of the montage visualization that is available at the Phototrails website: http://phototrails.net/tlv-weekapril-21-26. These montage visualizations organized all images according to a specific time and place average brightness or average hue of each photo, thus revealing a “signature” of dominant visual preferences that might indicate a shared experience by multiple Instagram users.

(Figure 12), (Figure 13), (Figure 14), and (Figure 15) come from the online paper of Nadav Hochman and Lev Manovich (2013). Montage visualizations have been used courtesy of Lev Manovich.

All “media visualizations” and research results have been mediated by visual interfaces of the particular social media platforms and networks. The researchers investigated how a computational analysis and “media visualizations” of social media images (users’ photos) could be engaged for the study of social, and cultural patterns that visualize the content of social media on multiple spatial, and temporal scales. The researchers discovered that each city has its own unique visual signature, based on Instagram photos organized by the measurements of visual attributes, such as hue median, brightness mean, and line orientation. Bangkok turned out to be the most visually different from other cities, such as Singapore and Tokyo. The research also looked at ways used by the Instagram medium among 312,694 people over a four-month period. Most people uploaded only one or several photos. The proportions of these active users vary significantly depending on the city. For example, the percentage of people who uploaded more than 30 photos was 2% in New York, 6.7% in Moscow, and 10.9% in Tel Aviv. The researchers discovered differences in using Instagram’s filters. In the sample the percentage of photos for which Instagram users applied filters was from 68 to 81%. The cities with the highest percentage of filtered photos were Tel Aviv, London, and San Francisco, and the city with the lowest was New York (Hochman & Manovich, 2013).
Fig. 16–17. Bangkok’s unique “visual signatures”, created by its Instagram photos. (Figure 16) is a visualization of 50,000 Instagram photos from Bangkok, organized by hue median (perimeter) and brightness mean (radius).

(Figure 17) is a full-size version in high resolution that is available at the Cultural Analytics Lab website: http://lab.culturalanalytics.info/2016/04/phototrails-visualizing-23-m-instagram.html. Bangkok’s “visual signatures” have been used courtesy of Lev Manovich.
The Photographic Project of Alain Delorme’s “Totems” in the Perspective of Zygmunt Bauman’s Consumer Society Theory

Alain Delorme, the contemporary French photographer, was born in 1979, and he was working in his Paris studio. During his artist residency in Shanghai, the largest city in China, he looked at a regional consumer society from a close perspective, and he expressed his subjective “model of vision” in the photographic project of “Totems.” In his artwork form, the artist diverged from the neutrality of documentary style, still accepting the distortions of recorded reality. His series of 18 photographs can be related to a critical theory of consumer society by Zygmunt Bauman (1998, pp. 79–85; 2002, pp. 180–200; 2005, pp. 23–42; 2007, pp. 52–81). Delorme captures his “Totems” in the aspects of consumerism, consumption, and social exclusion, constantly wondering about the meaning of these notions. By this reason, it is worth referring to Consuming Life, where Bauman (2007) claims that

“(…) ‘consumerism’ is a type of social arrangement that results from recycling mundane, permanent, and so to speak ‘regime-neutral’ human wants, desires and longings into the principal propelling and operating force of society, a force that coordinates systemic reproduction, social integration, social stratification and the formation of human individuals, as well as playing a major role in the processes of individual and group self-identification and in the selection and pursuit of individual life policies” (p. 28).

Fig. 18. Alain Delorme, “Totem” #1 (2010), the photographic project. (Figure 18) is available at Delorme’s website: https://www.alaindelorme.com/index.php/portfolio/totems and it has been used courtesy of the artist.
Following the critique of a consumer society Delorme wonders what is a real life of “Totems,” coming from his photographs. Chinese society is viewed as one that emphasizes the collective rather than the individual. Delorme’s photographs show an idea of workers as an anonymous labour force, and not the unique individuals. Bauman (2007) does believe that, in a consumer society, “Unlike consumption, primarily a trait and occupation of individual human beings, consumerism is an attribute of society” (p. 28). However, human life in a consumer society is not about changing the production role into a consumption one. For this reason, in Globalization: The Human Consequences, Bauman (1998) writes that “The consumer of a consumer society is a sharply different creature from consumers in any other societies thus far” (p. 80). When Delorme seems to draw the portrait of his “Small Workers,” who are living in the Shanghai streets, he is still making visual conclusions on the issues of the commodification of human beings. Therefore, in his artworks, the artist depicts the subjectivity in a consumer society which is obtained first by effectively fulfilling the consumer’s duty, and second, by making oneself a more attractive commodity for sale—it is the mystery of the subject-object dialectics in a consumer society. From this viewpoint, as Bauman (2007) claims, “Members of the society of consumers are themselves consumer commodities, and it is the quality of being a consumer commodity that makes them bona fide members of that society” (p. 57).
Fig. 20. Alain Delorme, “Totem” #7 (2010), the photographic project. (Figure 20) is available at Delorme’s website: https://www.alaindelorme.com/index.php/portfolio/totems and it has been used courtesy of the artist.

Fig. 21. Alain Delorme, “Totem” #8 (2010), the photographic project. (Figure 21) is available at Delorme’s website: https://www.alaindelorme.com/index.php/portfolio/totems and it has been used courtesy of the artist.
Delorme does believe that the individuals from his photographs are “(...) ‘totems of the mind’ self-consciously articulated ‘collective representations’1 (to use Durkheim’s phrase) of ideas, communities, and objects” (Mitchell, 2005, p. 190) in a consumer society. Therefore, it is worth asking who the people from his artworks are and are they really “personalized consumers”? Bauman (2005) tries to answer this question, writing that

“Work was the main factor of one’s social placement as well as of self-assessment: for all people except those who thanks to hereditary or acquired wealth could combine a life of leisure with self-sufficiency, the question of ‘who are you’ was answered by pointing to the company by which the asked man was employed and the capacity in which he was employed by it. In a society known for its knack and fondness for categorizing and classifying, the type of work was the decisive, pivotal classification from which everything else relevant to living among others followed” (p. 17).

By contrast, the main factor of social self-assessment and the goal for itself which it drives itself in a consumer society is consumption (p. 184).

Fig. 22. Alain Delorme, “Totem” #12 (2010), the photographic project. (Figure 22) is available at Delorme’s website: https://www.alaindelorme.com/index.php/portfolio/totems and it has been used courtesy of the artist.

1 The term was used by Émile Durkheim (2008), a French sociologist, who defined the concept of “collective representations” as symbols, ideas, images, categories, and he believed they do not belong to isolated individuals, but are the product of a social collectivity, and they have a common significance amongst all members of a social group in that they convey ideas, values, ideologies, giving the reality meaning, and social interactions, as well as help the human beings make sense of their existence (p. 11). Durkheim took up this concept from anthropologist Lucien Lévy-Bruhl. They are called “collective” because their meaning has not been decided by one person, but by a large group of people. As Durkheim (2008) states, “Collective representations are the result of an immense co-operation, which stretches out not only into space but into time as well; to make them, a multitude of minds have associated, united and combined their ideas and sentiments; for them, long generations have accumulated their experience and their knowledge. A special intellectual activity is therefore concentrated in them which is infinitely richer and complexer than that of the individual” (pp. 18–19).
However, Delorme’s conclusion regarding “Totems” is pessimistic. They can only count on social exclusion and their social status in a consumer society is marginalized relative to the dominant social order. Hence, they become social outcasts, who cannot be able to invest in social membership by consumption. As Bauman (2007) states “‘To consume’ therefore means to invest in one’s own social membership, which in a society of consumers translates as ‘saleability’: obtaining qualities for which there is already a market demand, or recycling the qualities already possessed into commodities for which demand can go on to be created” (p. 56). “Totems” are inefficient in the sphere of consumption because they become the “unfulfilled consumers” and they cannot be the basic factor of “saleability” characterized by a permanent increase in the commodification of human beings. As Bauman (2004) emphasizes “The unfulfilled consumers in the society of consumers cannot be so sure” (p. 26). In a consumer society there is no escape from regularities that make depersonalized people wallow in the surrounding things, and they are fascinated by them. Bauman (2007) writes that “In the society of consumers no one can become a subject without first turning into a commodity, and no one can keep his or her subjectness secure without perpetually resuscitating, resurrecting and replenishing the capacities expected and required of a sellable commodity. The ‘subjectivity’ of the subject (…) is focused on an unending effort to itself become, and remain, a saleable commodity. The most prominent feature of the society of consumers – however carefully concealed and most thoroughly covered up – is the transformation of consumers into commodities” (…) (p. 12).
Fig. 24. Alain Delorme, “Totem” #15 (2010), the photographic project. (Figure 24) is available at Delorme’s website: https://www.alaindelorme.com/index.php/portfolio/totems and it has been used courtesy of the artist.

Fig. 25. Alain Delorme, “Totem” #16 (2010), the photographic project. (Figure 25) is available at Delorme’s website: https://www.alaindelorme.com/index.php/portfolio/totems and it has been used courtesy of the artist.
On the one hand Delorme does believe that his photographs blur the borders between the visible and the invisible reality, and on the other hand he thinks that objects manufactured by “Totems” become the “Idols of the Tribe”\(^2\) (Mitchell, 2005, p. 189) for a consumer society. However, the artist is in agreement with Bauman (2007), who warns us against the effects of social ostracism, writing:

“Let us recall that according to the verdict of consumerist culture those individuals who settle for a finite assembly of needs, go solely by what they believe they need, and never look for new needs that might arouse a pleasurable yearning for satisfaction, are flawed consumers—that is, the variety of social outcast specific to the society of consumers. The threat and fear of ostracism and exclusion also hovers over those who are satisfied with the identity they possess and will settle for what their ‘significant others’ take them to be” (pp. 99–100).

Delorme deliberately prompts us to a critical observation in order to take a closer look at the issues of a consumer society that are associated with the “metaphor of liquidity.” (Bauman, 2012) considered by a more artistic decision rather than a scientific one, perfectly describing modernity from social and aesthetic perspectives.

Fig. 26. Alain Delorme, “Totem” #17 (2010), the photographic project. (Figure 26) is available at Delorme’s website: https://www.alaindelorme.com/index.php/portfolio/totems and it has been used courtesy of the artist.

\(^2\) W.J.T. Mitchell (2005) refers to Francis Bacon, who in *The New Organon*, emphatically argued “(...) that there are four kinds of ‘idols of the mind’ that must be eliminated by science: ‘Idols of the Tribe’ are the collectively shared errors that stem from the natural limits of the human sensorium (...)” (p. 189). In the “Introduction” to *The New Organon*, Bacon (2008) claimed that “The Idols of the Tribe are errors in perception itself, caused by the limitations of the human senses which give access to the data of nature” (p. XIX) and further, in the XLI paragraph of “Book One” of *The New Organon*, entitled “Aphorisms on the Interpretation of Nature and on the Kingdom of Man,” in a discussion on the “Idols of the Tribe,” Bacon (2008) claimed that “The idols of the tribe are founded in human nature itself and in the very tribe or race of mankind. The assertion that the human senses are the measure of things is false; to the contrary, all perceptions, both of sense and mind, are relative to man, not to the universe. The human understanding is like an uneven mirror receiving rays from things and merging its own nature with the nature of things, which thus distorts and corrupts it” (p. 41).
Conclusions

The concept of ocularcentrism is discussed, in the first part of this paper, as a culturally conditioned way of seeing which appears in a place of the physical seeing process. According to this approach, ocularcentrism is not a natural phenomenon, but a conventional one, and it depends on race, gender, identity, as well as the development of a given culture. Ocularcentrism is historically changeable and makes a dynamic structure. Therefore, it can be called “cultural seeing” that has developed within the process of making numerous social and cultural strategies of visuality which compete with each other, while making the structure of the “natural hierarchy of sight” in visual culture (De Bolla, 1996, pp. 63–81). Within the scope of ocularcentric ways of seeing, notice can be taken of a certain change that appeared in them, and regarding a dominance of their types. Jay (2013) writes that in the twentieth century a weakness of Cartesian perspectivalism and the critique of the Art of Describing appeared. In this situation, baroque vision remains the strongest. But all ocularcentric ways of seeing or scopic regimes are legally valid and they should not be depreciated, but pluralism and a historical volatility should be accepted (pp. 130–131).

In an essay conclusion of Scopic Regimes of Modernity, Jay (2013) writes that “Rather than to erect another hierarchy, it may therefore be more useful to acknowledge the plurality of scopic regimes now available to us,” (p. 132) and also the possibilities that were opened up by them in numerous theoretical perspectives of ocularcentrism and described models of vision.

The research project of Manovich’s “Phototrails” (2013) is described in the second part of this paper in the context of Software Studies and Cultural Analytics methods, as well as the photographic project of Delorme’s “Totems” (2010) is also discussed in the perspective of Bauman’s consumer society theory. These projects have taken up the issues of identity and seeing...
Joanne Finkelstein (2007), in *The Art of Self Invention*, writes about how visual media is shaping identity. She refers to the concept of self-identity, which has a cosmopolitan aspect in the historical process. The author claims that “Indeed, (this, note K.C.) the term has no simple and reliable definition, but it does have the important function of bringing focus to how we conduct ourselves in the public domain and how we pursue pleasures and cultivate tastes” (p. 112). To explain how the self-identity concept can be understood, Finkelstein calls to a surrealist Renè Magritte’s painting of *The Enchanted Domain* (1953): “In this image, the pieces of fruit are identical (perhaps like us), even in their choice of the mask as a device for concealment. The (party, note K.C.) mask itself, small, covering only the eyes, is totally inadequate as a disguise, yet it usefully alludes to the confident way we employ objects to express aspects of ourselves to others in the world.” However, Finkelstein (2007) considers that these masks are a summary of many questions raised by explorations for an identity meaning and she suggests the questions of what can really be accomplished by wearing of these masks—“what exactly is being concealed and what is being revealed?” (p. 95). Magritte leaves these questions unanswered. Thinking about the idea of the mask, we are drawn into various examples of theoretical problems that are always accompanied by “the displays of identity,” in an understanding of queer and feminist theory, proposed by Amelia Jones (2012) in her *Seeing Differently: A History and Theory of Identification and the Visual Arts*. These issues are discussed in relation to identity politics, which offer a history and theory of “identity,” “post-identity,” and “identification” as many perspectives of “seeing and reconceiving difference” in contemporary visual culture (pp. 218–243).

Fig. 28. Renè Magritte (1898–1967) *The Enchanted Domain* (French: *Le Domaine Enchanté*, 1953), an oil painting reproduction, The Albertina Museum in Vienna: “From Monet to Picasso,” The Batliner Collection. (Figure 28) is available at the Albertina Museum website: https://sammlungenonline.albertina.at/#/query/85899c8a-c9f5-4cb6-899f-9b44c76fd0bf and it has been used courtesy of the Albertina Museum.
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